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TEACHING FEDERAL COURTS: 
FROM BOTTOM LINE TO MYSTERY 
LAURA E. LITTLE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal Courts sounds dry.  It isn’t.  The subject controls some of the most 
compelling issues of our time; the War on Terror,1 the Terri Schiavo 
litigation,2 and the presidential election of 20003 are just a few of the 
controversies that have turned on Federal Courts issues.  In just the last four 
years, the standing doctrine alone has spawned decisions impacting such hot-
button issues as greenhouse gas emissions,4 corporate tax breaks,5 school 
desegregation,6 election financing,7 faith-based initiatives,8 and a school 
child’s freedom to decline to recite the Pledge of Allegiance.9  Federal Courts 
cases acquaint students with a large portion of the Constitution, introduce 
profound debates about the optimum structure of government, and offer 
practical knowledge about federal litigation.  Yielding even larger lessons 
beyond its doctrinal limits, the course renders students expert in the structure 
of Supreme Court opinions and initiates students in rhetorical and linguistic 
 
* Professor of Law and James E. Beasley Chair in Law, Temple University’s Beasley School of 
Law.  Copyright 2009 held by Laura E. Little.  I am grateful to my colleague, Sophie Smyth, and 
my research assistant, Alice Ko, for their help on this project. 
 1. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 2. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 3. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 4. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 5. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006). 
 6. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 7. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008). 
 8. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).  The Roberts Court 
has in fact issued many more standing opinions, but not all may be fairly characterized as 
implicating “hot buttons.”  See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. __, 
128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008) (dispute concerning payphones). 
 9. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
798 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:797 
 
Litigation Timeline 
devices useful where human interaction calls for subtlety (and perhaps even 
obfuscation).10 
Despite these compelling reasons for taking Federal Courts,11 many 
students run from the subject.  In teaching the course, I have experimented 
with remedies to counteract this tendency to flee.  Now, after more than a few 
years teaching Federal Courts, I have several reliable antidotes, which divide 
roughly into five categories: (1) bottom-line practicality; (2) current events; (3) 
storytelling; (4) taxonomy; and (5) mystery.  The antidotes, which reflect 
progressively expanding levels of abstraction, make the course less scary and 
more appealing.  My real design though is to harness the antidotes as vehicles 
to transport students to a sophisticated level of learning and understanding. 
I.  BOTTOM-LINE PRACTICALITY 
The enormous complexity and subtle abstraction of Federal Courts 
doctrine inspires much student concern.  Students can become disoriented as 
they miss the big picture (the proverbial forest) while entangled in the doctrine 
(the proverbial trees).  One principle, however, offers steadfast support through 
the thicket of doctrinal details: all Federal Courts cases, at bottom, concern 
whether a case can stay in federal court.  While a case may present a host of 
seemingly obscure legal issues, a bottom line question provides focus: can the 
federal court get to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim?  To reinforce this 
concept, I often supplement discussion with a graphical timeline to illustrate 
strands of doctrine or events in specific cases.  The skeleton of this line starts 
on the far left with a point representing the beginnings of a case or controversy, 
a middle point represents filing a complaint in a United States district court, 
and a far right point designates ultimate review in the United States Supreme 
Court.12 
   Case or         United States 
controversy     district court                                                                      United States Supreme 
   begins         complaint filed                                                                           Court review 
 
 
 
 10. For ideas on how to illustrate linguistic devices used in Federal Courts opinions, see  
Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 
46 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1998) (surveying use of passive voice, nominalization, subject 
complements, role reversal, relexicalization, verb form, and tropes in holdings of federal 
jurisdiction cases).  See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism 
Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 961 (1997) (observing how the Supreme Court decided 
1990s federalism decisions in a “highly formalistic” manner by reasoning deductively “from 
largely unjustified major premises to conclusions”). 
 11. And I haven’t even mentioned the presence of Federal Courts issues in nearly one-third 
of the multi-state bar examination questions on constitutional law. 
 12. For a more elaborate timeline, illustrating the intricacies of the Younger doctrine, see 
LAURA E. LITTLE, FEDERAL COURTS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 199 (2007). 
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A corollary principle explains parties’ incentives: the plaintiff generally 
wants the case in federal court and the defendant generally wants the case out 
of federal court.13  Drawing students’ attention to these incentives provides the 
opportunity to frame discussion in light of litigation strategy.  One can, for 
example, discuss the structure of the original suit in New York Times v. 
Sullivan,14 explaining how the plaintiff may have joined defendants from his 
home state in order to defeat complete diversity and pointing out how the 
Mottley15 rule hogtied the defendant New York Times, preventing it from 
raising its First Amendment defense first in federal, rather than state, court.  
This focus on parties’ strategic behavior not only injects larger context to fine 
threads of doctrine, but can dramatize material that does not always hold 
uninterrupted interest for the uninitiated.16 
Concentrating on the bottom line serves as a pedagogical anchor for 
students and showcases an important policy issue pertaining to court access.  
By evaluating whether a Federal Courts opinion allows a specific class of 
plaintiffs to stay in federal court, students can see how a topic seemingly 
divorced from subject matter jurisdiction—such as complete preemption17 or 
pleading requirements18—directly controls whether certain plaintiffs have 
federal court access. 
II.  CURRENT EVENTS 
People love an inside story and an expert understanding of a particular 
subject matter.  Consistent with these inclinations, students respond well to 
discovering a news item that implicates their learning.19  The news story 
 
 13. The obvious exception, of course, being cases presented in the posture of a removal 
petition. 
 14. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  An excellent source of background drama for this case is 
ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW:  THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991). 
 15. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
 16. George Rutherglen also advocates focus on parties’ strategic motivation in litigation as a 
means to add interest to a course in Civil Procedure.  See George Rutherglen, Teaching Civil 
Procedure: Past and Prologue, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 13, 15–20 (2003). 
 17. See, e.g., Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 11 (2003) (complete 
preemption creates federal question jurisdiction in case concerning usury claim against national 
bank); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 399 (1987) (complete preemption creates 
federal question jurisdiction where plaintiff seeks to enforce claim under collective bargaining 
agreement). 
 18. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading requirements in 
Sherman Act antitrust case); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & 
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (pleading requirements in § 1983 suits). 
 19. Although little research on the use of current events in legal education is available, 
studies in educational fields show the utility of news articles in the classroom.  See, e.g., Kathleen 
Cornely, Content and Conflict: The Use of Current Events to Teach Content in a Biochemistry 
Course, 31 BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY EDUC. 173, 175 (2003) (discussing the use 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
800 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:797 
illustrates a concrete setting in which to view abstract principles learned in the 
classroom and delivers an “in the know” feeling that validates the hard work 
that went into mastering those abstract principles.  Students both appreciate 
seeing how the doctrine plays out in real life and enjoy special insight about 
how legal principles animate the forces at work in the news story.  I do not 
leave to chance the possibility that students actually discover news stories; 
instead I distribute electronic or hard copy versions of stories I encounter 
myself.  And, of course, Federal Courts jurisprudence is full of news pegs.  In 
addition to civil rights and military tribunal issues, preemption issues have 
most recently posed a particularly strong presence in headlines.20 
Interest and understanding also expand when students appreciate how 
technical “procedural” rules might control whether courts recognize and 
develop constitutional principles at the center of public debate.  For example, a 
topic as seemingly dry and obscure as the Eleventh Amendment is crucial to 
whether federal courts recognize and enforce federal civil rights against state 
government incursion.  Highlighting this observation, I introduce the Eleventh 
Amendment materials by observing that, if the Supreme Court had indulged 
suggestions to read the Amendment’s language broadly, the public would 
never have seen the likes of Roe v. Wade,21 Goldberg v. Kelly,22  Brown v. 
Board of Education,23 or Lawrence v. Texas.24  Likewise, students light up 
upon learning how a rule as apparently legalistic as Teague v. Lane’s25 
retroactivity principle can dramatically retard the development of 
constitutional protections for the criminally accused. 
 
of case studies based on current events as an effective method of teaching biochemical principles 
and heightening student interest in the topic); Michael J. O’Sullivan, Teaching Undergraduate 
Community Psychology: Integrating the Classroom and the Surrounding Community, 20 
TEACHING OF PSYCHOL. 80, 82 (1993) (reporting that students credited current events discussion 
with enhancing learning of community psychology concepts). 
 20. The connection between federal preemption and personal injury actions has recently 
garnered preemption issues a place on the front page.  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Drug Label, 
Maimed Patient and Crucial Test for Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at A1 (discussing 
products liability preemption issues in the Supreme Court, October Term 2008).  Perhaps more 
surprising to students, however, is the interplay among preemption issues, ideology, and court 
power in the context of business matters.  For interesting sources on the connection between 
business and preemption see David G. Savage, Trumping the States—Business Is Finding Success 
in Federal Pre–emption Cases, A.B.A. J., May 2008, at 26 (describing pro-business benefits of 
United States Supreme Court’s pro-business jurisprudence); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38 (reviewing the exceptionally pro–business orientation of 
the recent Supreme Court cases).  For a sampling of civil rights and other headline–catching 
Federal Courts issues see supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
 21. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 22. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 24. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 25. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
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Through understanding the implications of Federal Courts decisions in the 
daily lives of regular people, students learn the “dark underbelly” of procedural 
rules.  Some react more cynically than others to the notion that decision 
makers might conceal the impact of legal principles within a shroud of 
jurisdictional rules.  Nonetheless, all students benefit from knowing that their 
work with the complex doctrines enables them to hone their expertise on the 
wheels of power, including mechanisms by which a decision maker might 
manipulate the legal system to elude the attention of the press and public.  This 
access to insiders’ law—one hopes—contributes to students’ sense of calling 
and role morality.  Students may start to appreciate the importance of lawyers 
acting as ambassadors, translators, and opinion leaders in a world of principles 
impermeable to the uninitiated. 
III.  STORYTELLING 
My invocation of ordinary people with ordinary problems is not confined 
to real news items or social ills that capture headlines.  I also travel into the 
realm of imagination to develop stories exposing how rules affect citizens who 
are experiencing pain or hardship.  While arguably trite if presented for 
fiction’s sake alone, the stories give contour to the legal discussion and provide 
grounding for students as they grapple with the specifics of the rules.  For 
example, I begin what is perhaps the most technical and confusing unit in a 
Federal Courts course—habeas corpus—by asking students to imagine two 
competing narratives: (1) the plight of an innocent defendant who was 
railroaded by overzealous prosecutors and judges running for reelection and 
(2) the emotions of a homicide victim’s relative toward a convicted defendant 
who has successfully convinced a habeas court to order a new trial. 
Similarly, I create for each unit at least one hypothetical problem designed 
with several goals in mind.  First, students should enjoy a feeling of mastery 
after evaluating possible resolutions of the problem.  Second, the problem’s 
facts should expose ambiguities or “soft spots” in the legal doctrine.  In this 
way, students not only learn to identify the law’s deficiencies and to tolerate 
lack of certainty, but they also practice making arguments on many sides of a 
legal question.  The problem should provide an opportunity for characterizing 
facts so as to support competing points of view on the law.  If possible, the 
problem should demonstrate how unexpected consequences unfold when a 
legal rule developed in one context is applied in another.  From this exercise, 
students see how doctrines can play out in litigation, reinforce their knowledge 
of legal rules and the dynamics of common law development, and practice 
rhetorical skills. 
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IV.  TAXONOMY 
Some Federal Courts students take comfort in the concrete qualities and 
narrative aspects of hypothetical problems and current events.  Others are more 
attracted to the work of categorizing cases and doctrines.  Those who enjoy the 
academic side of law school are often predisposed to this latter approach to 
processing new information.  What law professor among us has not been 
teased for our analytical tendencies to sort and classify all that life hands us! 
The process of creating taxonomies and categorizing data is a crucial 
pedagogical tool26—particularly for those who are inclined to use their 
brainpower in such ways.  In modeling (and indeed endorsing) this way of 
learning the material, I focus first on governmental theory.  Specifically, I 
work with the class in identifying whether opinions express a view on the best 
department of government for handling the legal problem presented: State or 
federal governments?  Executive, legislative, or judicial branches?  In the 
process of discerning these preferences, students must focus on such matters as 
the constitutional language cited, implicit or explicit assumptions about parity 
between state and federal courts, and ideologies reflected about which 
department of government is most capable of handling a particular legal 
problem while simultaneously preserving liberty. 
The work of identifying assumptions about governmental values affords an 
opportunity for students to get the cases into their heads, to dissect reasoning, 
and to appreciate how governmental values color and affect the disposition of 
Federal Courts cases.  In addition to providing this opportunity for students to 
identify governmental values at play in the case law, I introduce a number of 
jurisprudential concepts that they can practice using to sort the cases, such as 
formalism, functionalism, pragmatism, legal process, and legal realism. 
I hold fast to one caveat: understanding diminishes if students hold too fast 
to categories and classifications.  For deep appreciation, students need to 
understand the dangers of creating an immutable grid for organizing the 
essence of case law.  They benefit from learning to tolerate (and maybe even to 
celebrate) ambiguity and appreciating that many cases fail to fit perfectly into a 
particular paradigm.27 The cases are complex and likely filled with 
contradiction. 
 
 26. See Thomas J. Shuell, Phases of Meaningful Learning, 60 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 531, 
541–43 (1990) (outlining the process of attaining deeper learning through categorization of 
information into preexisting schemata and refinement of these schemata through application to 
specific cases). 
 27. Learning theorist Thomas Shuell explains that in the intermediate phase of learning, 
students form new “schemata” or matrices that provide them with greater ability to conceptualize 
at high levels of abstraction.  Id. at 542.  Shuell makes clear, however, that these “new structures 
and schemata do not yet allow the learner to function in a fully autonomous, or automatic, basis.”  
Id.  I maintain that a critical understanding of the limits of schemata is crucial to the goal of 
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The dangers of essentializing case law are evident in all legal contexts, 
particularly those governed by common law, with its erratic development and 
dependence on the specifics of parties’ disputes and litigation strategies.  
Several factors enhance these dangers for Federal Courts opinions.  First, since 
Federal Courts decisions concern largely abstract phenomena divorced from 
boundaries in physical reality, courts enjoy more latitude in creating 
indeterminate and mutable doctrine in that area.  In related fashion, as explored 
below, Federal Courts decisions seem to reflect complex unstated agendas.28  
For these reasons, a student’s characterization of a decision may belie the 
decision writer’s intended effect or the intention discerned by another reader.  
Moreover, the subject matter of Federal Courts—court power—is not one that 
lends itself to candor and to clarity, since the agents writing—United States 
Supreme Court Justices29—often stand to benefit directly from the opinion.30  
Similarly, the institutional context of federal jurisdiction decisions may 
counsel the Justices to avoid “flashpoints” or “landmines” that spark the 
attention of other interested entities (such as administrative agencies, other 
courts, and Congress), inspiring those entities to look for ways to circumvent 
the decision’s force.31  In light of these factors, I counsel students to be 
cautious in becoming wedded to their own characterizations of decisions.  One 
student’s classification of the decision may belie the Justices’ intended effect 
for the decision or vary dramatically with another reader’s rational 
interpretation of its words. 
To sensitize students to the dangers of trying to distill an immutable 
essence from the Federal Courts opinions, I ask students to identify possible 
paradoxes or contradictions in the opinion writers’ positions.  I might ask, for 
example, why Justice Brennan—ordinarily associated with expanding federal 
authority—restricted federal court access in Franchise Tax Board v. 
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,32 or why Justice O’Connor—normally 
associated with deference to state prerogatives—might have expanded federal 
 
developing students’ autonomous facility with legal materials.  This facility includes the students’ 
ability to see beyond orthodox paradigms for conceiving the case law. 
 28. For a discussion of ulterior motives and unstated agendas, see infra notes 39–41 and 
accompanying text. 
 29. See Little, supra note 10, at 120–22 (noting that Justices often use the services of 
ghostwriter law clerks but still maintain ultimate control of the work product). 
 30. See id. at 155 (showing how sensitive issues of judicial power may affect the manner in 
which opinions are written). 
 31. See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 20 (1964) (observing 
that opinion writers may be mindful of avoiding “imprudent judgments” that could “undermine 
public faith in the Justices and strengthen interest-group leaders and government officials who 
support policies contrary to those of the Court”). 
 32. 463 U.S. 1 (1983). 
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court power to review state decisions in Michigan v. Long.33  When the 
Supreme Court issued several pro-business, pro-preemption decisions34 during 
the October Term of 2007, were nearly all the Justices acting inconsistently 
with their usual beliefs?  After all, those Justices who generally vote to restrict 
federal power voted to expand it through federal preemption, and those 
Justices who generally champion the rights of individual citizens voted instead 
to protect corporate assets.35 
Similarly, if a student offers a characterization of an opinion such as 
“liberal” or “conservative,” I inquire about those labels.  What is the point of 
reference for defining these terms?  Does the identity of the opinion’s author 
give the opinion that character?  Isn’t it possible that the opinion is the product 
of significant compromise (and consequent irrationality), which affects how 
one should properly understand the opinion?  How do we calibrate the 
concepts “liberal” and “conservative”?  Should economic values, governmental 
values, and all other social values be considered?  Should we develop a 
measure based on the “median Justice”36 for the Supreme Court at fixed points 
in time? 
To encourage flexibility in students’ conceptions of doctrinal categories, I 
offer them hypothetical fact patterns that present several routes for resolution.  
In this way, students see that doctrinal boundaries blur and legal problems can 
be characterized in myriad directions.37  For example, a hypothetical 
presenting a possible Pennhurst38 Eleventh Amendment question might be 
disposed of as a supplemental jurisdiction problem, or the state law 
complication in the hypothetical might be avoided if the facts are presented as 
an invitation to create federal common law. 
 
 33. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 34. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (pro-
business); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (pro-preemption). 
 35. See, e.g., Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1000 (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito joined the entire majority opinion finding federal preemption 
of cardiac patient’s state law tort action against the manufacturer of a balloon catheter); Rowe v. 
N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 989, 990 (2008) (Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Breyer, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Alito joined the majority 
opinion finding federal preemption, shielding corporate delivery services from state laws 
requiring them to verify buyer’s legal age before delivering goods such as cigarettes). 
 36. Anna Harvey, What Makes a Judgment “Liberal”?  Coding Bias in the United States 
Supreme Court Judicial Database 1–2 (Working Paper Presented at the 3rd Annual Conference 
on Empirical Legal Studies Papers at Cornell Law School, Sept. 13, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120970 (discussing definitional problems for terms “liberal” and 
“conservative” as well as introducing the concept of “liberal judgment”). 
 37. For further discussion of characterization possibilities, see Laura E. Little, 
Characterization and Legal Discourse, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 372 (1996). 
 38. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
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V.  MYSTERY 
One must assume that the Justices are not blind to the significant impact of 
jurisdictional rulings on the fortunes of litigants and on the development of 
substantive law.39  One might also expect that these effects might influence the 
result and reasoning in cases.  Legions of law review articles and other 
scholarly criticism explore and attempt to document ideological and partisan 
ulterior motives underlying Federal Courts decisions.40  Yet, as a pedagogical 
approach, ceaseless reference to ideological agendas and ulterior motives 
unsettles students—leaving them with many seemingly mysterious, 
unanswered questions: How do I identify the true motive for a decision?  
Should I ignore the stated reason for a decision?  Is the common law 
methodology of explaining factual distinctions among cases a sham? 
Analysis of ideological and partisan motives can thus be disorienting for 
the beginning student struggling with a complex web of doctrines.41  Yet 
students should consider these matters in order to develop a more subtle 
understanding of both the specific cases governing federal jurisdiction as well 
as the more general question of whether ideological motivations eliminate the 
credibility and legitimacy of legal rules altogether.  For this reason, I lead 
students into the mysterious territory of motivation, but do so after we are well 
into the course, once I get a sense that most students are proficient in 
deciphering Federal Courts cases. 
To broach the matter of Justices’ motivations, I present the following 
questions to students: Why does the ideology popularly known as conservatism 
so often get yoked to states’ rights?  Why does the ideology popularly known 
as liberalism get yoked to federal governmental strength?  Is this an accident of 
history, or do the ideologies link analytically to a particular preference for one 
 
 39. See, e.g., Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon of 
Acceptable Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89, 89 (1998) (using terms “naked ideology,” “naked 
politics,” and “raw substance” to suggest that “jurisdictional rulings do (and should) often turn on 
their direct substantive implications for the litigants and the broader development of substantive 
law”). 
 40. See, e.g., Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 549 
(2008) (endorsing the view that in allocating cases between state and federal court, the Supreme 
Court is not acting “impartially” and is instead expecting that the allocation decision will 
ultimately deny a constitutional guarantee); Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal 
Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between State and Federal Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 
1226 (2004) (“[T]here is a very real concern whether jurisdictional outcomes are . . . the product 
of naked ideology.”); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 319  n.65 (1984) 
(characterizing a traditional Federal Courts course as “the purest of contentless legalist rituals, in 
which all ‘policy’ arguments are grounded in funhouse mirror versions of Competence and 
Federalism whether they can conceivably be brought to bear on particular cases or not”). 
 41. See generally Shuell, supra note 26, at 534, 544 (arguing that learning methods and 
content should vary according to where students are in the learning process and that premature 
introduction of certain matters “may be counterproductive”). 
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governmental unit rather than another?  For example, do smaller units such as 
states more ably accommodate values normally associated with conservatism? 
Once we introduce and discuss these questions, I ask the students to read 
the remaining cases in the course with these questions in mind.  I remind them 
of this angle on the material on the final day of the course, admonishing them 
to keep the questions in mind as they complete their full review of the course.  
My hope is that channeling their inquiry through this particular lens will 
encourage them to read the cases closely and empower them to think critically 
about the opinions without losing their grounding as they acquire the basic 
rules.  They can never know what the Justices are truly trying to accomplish, 
but the questions provide a way to evaluate the verity of proffered reasoning 
and to comprehend profound questions about political structure. 
CONCLUSION 
Through the five devices of bottom-line practicality, current events, 
storytelling, taxonomy, and mystery, I aim to give students a toehold for 
understanding and insight into the richness of the material presented in Federal 
Courts.  Some of the devices trick students into learning.  For example, the 
advice to focus on the bottom-line effect of a rule allows students to stumble 
upon merits-manipulating motives behind jurisdictional principles.  Likewise, 
the use of emotional hypothetical stories engages students unwittingly in a 
process of learning by doing.  And urging them to create comforting 
taxonomies according to labels such as “conservative” and “liberal” contrives 
to introduce them to the contingent nature of categories as well as the 
categories’ connection with important political and jurisprudential theories. 
The trick, however, is benign.  I have found that the five angles on the 
material are effective stratagems for steeping students in intricacies of Federal 
Courts law and empowering them to assess critically larger issues of legal 
process.  Federal Courts is an enormously rich subject, with ramifications far 
beyond its apparent boundaries.  Whatever Federal Courts teachers can do to 
keep future lawyers focused on the subject in an expansive, contextualized 
sense is an essential contribution to the profession. 
